Japan has over the last decade struggled to kick-start its
economy, though the current round of Abenomics is certainly the most persuasive reform effort yet. On the last attempt Japan fell back into a "triple-dip" recession (recording two quarters of negative GDP growth) in 2014,[i] after the GST increase to 8%. The economy did return to growth by the end
of the year (with GDP expanding 1.5% in the March 2014 qtr),[ii] however the growth was far below expectations given the stimulus supporting the program. There was simply no reason to expect stronger household
spending as long as wages stagnate.
There has been a long-standing opportunity for Japan to
reform. The task would have been far easier if the nation had taken such
measures whilst the global economy was ‘humming’, but such opportunities were
squandered due to:
- Controversial corruption allegations (with
respect to political donations) against a raft of PMs, political leaders and Diet
members[iii]
- Reticence on the part of Diet members to expose
their constituents to reform
- Historically an absence for a policy imperative outside of the
bureaucracy
Abe was able to resurrect a party coalition with a substantial
parliamentary majority, but was not able to achieve any concrete progress with
structural reform, which led to his electoral demise in his first term. It was
only the ineptitude of the DPJ and his resounding win in the December 2014
election[iv]
that seems to have allowed him to mature as a political leader, giving him the
time to challenge entrenched interests.
Latest efforts to invigorate Japan
Poor economic data in this latest July-2015 quarter has given market analysts reason to
expect more stimulus from the Bank of Japan. Paradoxically, Japanese stocks rose on the announcement, which goes to show that investors
are favorably disposed to any effort that supports asset prices, whether ‘real’ or
‘illusionary’. It does not matter if there is confidence in the reform process or not, as long a there is concurrent stimulus. Expectations for BoJ stimulus might prove wrong if instead it
is the Fed that pursues stimulus. That is to say, there is a
good reason to expect a concurrent Fed program to:
- Raise interest rates by 25bp in Sept-2015
- Quantitative easing in order to stimulate the US
market
One might ask whether the US market actually needs such
stimulus given that US employment is supposedly on the rise, and new vehicle
sales are at record levels. There is other evidence however to suggest that not
all is well in the US economy, namely:
- US inventory levels - see the ominous signs of recession below
- Stock and bond prices - note the tendency for stock indices to fall every 7 years (2001, 2008 and now 2015??)
- Workforce participation - trending down for a long time
Source: Trading View & Federal Reserve; trend analysis by Andrew Sheldon
Japan's benchmark Nikkei-225 index rose 0.6% to 20,637pts in
response to the poor data.[v]
It is possible the Japanese government will resort to more stimulus in the belief that the corporate sector is in the process of boosting investment, as well as an expected ‘flow-on’ effect from lower commodity prices, as well as reduced coal and oil imports, thanks to the recommencement of nuclear energy production by the Japanese utilities, however the contribution is relatively minor.
There is every reason to believe however that any attempt to
stimulate the US and Japanese economies will achieve nothing, and that both
economies are destined to fall into recession, due to lax activity in the ‘real
economy’. There can be expected to be concurrent weakness in asset market.
A muted economy is of course not terribly problematic for
governments when you consider that they can have confidence in:
- Their
control of the process – with their limited majoritive mandate
- Moral and
political relativism – constituents have little choice – and Japan is not singularly a ‘weak economy’. There is also a global disdain for government.
- Media
support – the media and public are reticent to trust political opponents. Globally there seems to be a campaign of destabilisation by the media.
Evidence of slowing economy
The problem for Japan is that:
- Without
substantive reform, no one will have any confidence in the sustainability in
the economic outlook
- Without
any expectation of a stronger global economy, more ‘currency competitiveness’
will do little to ignite export industries, since its competitors will simply resort to the same measures.
- Without
the tangible prospect of more jobs and higher incomes, the prospect of higher
prices will just result in a decline in real wages.
This is precisely
what we are seeing, with the results for the June quarter alluding to:
- A
slowing in economic activity – with a contraction in household spending
and business investment resulting in an annualized 1.6% decline in GDP in the
Mar-2015 quarter.[vi]
- Household real incomes falling in the wake of
the GST hike, as the cost of living rises.
There are hopes
within the government and BOJ that growth will eventually prevail. Economists
are forecasting a modest 2% annualised GDP for the Sept-2015 quarter.[vii]
Japan is not all bad news
It is not all bad news for Japan. Consider that:
- Japan ran a current account surplus of ¥8.18
trillion for the 6 months to June 2015, the highest since late 2010.[viii]
- Japan is a big beneficiary of lower crude oil
prices, significantly reducing its trade imports
- Japan is also destined to benefit from a
substantial reduction in oil, natural gas (i.e. LNG) and coal imports as
nuclear power generation is resumed from nuclear plants mothballed in the wake
of the Tohoku tsunami disaster
- The weak Yen is destined to stimulate growth in
national income as Japanese exports become increasingly competitive. The yen
has fallen 50% against the USD since the end of 2012.[ix]
- The Japanese property market is relatively
‘cheaply priced’ outside of the central business district
- Japan retains a ‘trump card’ insofar as it is
able to boost immigration to ‘grow its economy’, in the process increasing
demand, serving as well to reduce the burden upon taxpayers in per capita terms.
- Asset prices are bouyant, as is the case
elsewhere in the globe. The Nikkei index has steadily risen to an 8-year
high during 2015.[x]
Japan’s trade statistics are trending in the right
direction, with the trade deficit falling to ¥422 billion (down from ¥6.2
trillion in the previous year) on the back of a 5.9% increase in exports and
8.8% increase in imports. Japan also benefits from stronger remittances of
investment income as the Yen weakens, up 26.1% to ¥10.51 trillion.[xi]
The stronger trade balance is largely the result of stronger
sales of automobiles and electronic parts, and yet these muted sales are largely the result of the weaker
yen rather than stronger export markets. The concern of course is that Japan’s QE program is destined to see other
competing nations simply resort to the same policy, rather than engaging in any
steps to reform the economy, or the devaluation of their currency in the same vain. This has prompted some economists to expect a 'currency war', which will inevitably serve no one, but simply to undermine confidence in the political actors.
Another bonus for the Japanese economy has been the influx
of tourists as the yen has depreciated. The Japanese government has achieved
its target of 10 million tourists in 2015, having deferred the target in the
wake of the Tohoku earthquake. The tourist bureau is now targeting 20 million
tourists by 2020 – the year of the Tokyo Olympics, and 30 million of tourists
by 2030. The trade surplus attributable to tourism was a record ¥527.3 billion
in the period, on the back of a record 9.14 million incoming tourists and a
concurrent 4.9% decline in departing Japanese nationals to 7.62 million. These
economic statistics are based upon an average forex rate of ¥120.28 for the
period – a 17.4% reduction over the previous period.[xii] Japan’s
external accounts remain in good shape, with the nation recording its 12th
successive monthly current account surplus – the latest being ¥558.6 billion.[xiii]
The overarching problem
The problem however is not Japan’s external relationship
with the rest of the world, but rather the alienation of its unskilled
workforce and savers, who are bearing the bulk of the state’s burden. Part time work and low interest rates are undermining the wealth and income prospects for a great many Japanese people. There is
every possibility that Japan will eventually cope by:
- Raising tax on assets
- Raising immigration
- Depreciating the currency
- Retaining its mercantilist policy – if it
can expect to rely on any growth in the export economy
- Reforming the economy – to boost Japan’s
long-term competitiveness.[xiv]
i.
Slashing business regulations
ii.
Reducing corporate taxes
iii.
Facilitating industry diversification
There is a great deal of concern about Japan’s debt levels.
The fact is however that the debt is ‘national’ debt, just as the US debt is
denominated in USD terms. Both countries are therefore not in a serious
problem in these terms.
The other problem is that the dispensation to date has been
to undermine the financial viability of most Japanese people for the sake of
asset-rich Japanese people who live in the middle of the cities. The central
hubs of Japan have experienced an asset ‘bubble’ that has not extended into the
suburban areas because their ‘negative real incomes’ and poorer job prospects
don’t invite such property investment. Nor does their lack of financial
literacy give them much change of raising their prospects.
The reform program to date
You could be forgiven for thinking that deflation is the
intractable problem undermining Japan’s economy given the attempts to resuscitate inflation. The problem however is not deflation, just as inflation is not the
solution. Deflation is actually natural and good. The problem is declining real
incomes (or ‘stagnant wages’), that undermines investment and spending. There
are of course economist theorists who will argue that ‘2% inflation’ is good
for growth because it purportedly brings forward spending. In fact, such
illusions are not valid. Certainly PM Shinzo Abe is not relying solely on
stimulus. This is merely the ‘grease’ of 'monetary illusion' to lubricate the adjustment period by
avoiding apprehensions. The key elements of the structural adjustment program
can be expected to be:
- Ending
subsidies for the rural economy – curtailing spending – these burdens are
being shifted to the ‘end of term’ of the government, so they are largely
weighing upon any incoming government.
- Labour
market reform which was already adopted by the previous LDP PM Koizumi, and
the corporate sector, when it wound back lifetime employment, and shifted a
great many workers to casual labour terms.
- Reducing
material costs by reducing tariffs on trade and the costs of poor regulation. This has the benefit of
reducing the size of government, and improving the sustainability of
government, given that it shifts the burden of government to those who can
afford (by virtue of profits) away from those who can't afford to carry it.
There are of course those who will argue that 'wealth needs to be placed in the hands of the rich in order to stimulate investment'. The truth is that this fails to acknowledge the disparity or 'wage gap' because Western and third world markets. We can say that the solution to Japan's dilemma, and every Western government is to 'slash the costs of living' by effectively ending all but the basic foundations for government, and thereafter privatising those, to ensure those services are performed efficiently. Efficiently demands consequences. If governments are free to extort wealth, they will not offer good service. No country in the West defies this 'truth', except Japan to the extent that Japan's bureaucrats are motivated by simple routines and an overarching sense of responsibility for the lives of others.
Further reform areas
In June 2014, the Abe administration offered its latest
outline of comprehensive reform measures, including corporate tax cuts, agriculture
liberalization and deregulation of the energy, environment, and health-care
sectors.[xv] A
broad online of the critical reform measures by PM Abe are:
- Economic
stimulus in the form of:
i.
Fiscal
spending largely on infrastructure construction as well as ‘key strategic
sectors’
ii.
Quantitative
easing to restore liquidity to the marketplace, so people can spend, and so
that the resulting currency depreciation will make the export sector more
competitive.
iii.
Corporate
tax cuts to inventivise wage rises and business investment.
- Political
independence – Japan has long relied upon the US to preserve its political
security, with the US still preserving a number of naval and air bases in
Japan, such as Okinawa and Fussa. Proposed amendments to the Japanese
constitution are intended to surmount that ‘military dependency’.
- Executive
disempowerment – Executive government in Japan has long struggled with a
reliance upon the bureaucracy for information and analysis. Former PM Koizumi
was the first to develop certain capacities within the PM’s Office to develop
policy, with Cabinet having previously relied on the bureaucracy to advance
policy initiatives.
- Social
reform – There is a need for Japan to revise the way constituents think
about the government, society, and their relationship to it. There is an
entrenched ‘collectivism’ (or tribalism) in Japan that diminishes intellectual
independence. The pressing obstacles include:
i.
Attitudes
to immigration – An influx of tourists might help that, or hinder.
ii.
Attitudes
to women in the world place that has seen the erection of glass ceiling
that largely dissuade women from participating in economic activity – both in
absolute and qualitative terms. Female workforce participation is 10% lower
than the OECD average.
[xvi]
The government is intending to raise this level.
[xvii]
- Regulatory
burden – The business sector struggles to achieve outcomes when they are
subject to a litany of unnecessary impediments that undermine productivity and
profitability. These impediments are largely to blame for the historic
ascension of government-backed monopolies, be they private or publicly-owned, in
sectors such as power and agriculture. The solution is perceived to be privatization
(for instance – the utilities like TEPCO) and deregulation (i.e.
competitiveness). Among these obstacles are:
i.
Restrictions on the hiring and firing of staff. Lifetime
employment remains an obstacle to revitalisation of companies – particularly in
the upper echelons of companies. There has already been a great deal of reform
of the unskilled and lower echelons of Japanese corporations, however the
incumbents in the upper echelons have avoided any burden. The implication is
that there are about “5 million workers who can’t be laid off, even with
severance pay” whilst concurrently 40% of the Japanese workforce is struggling
to get regular or full-time work.[xviii]
Considerable labour market reform has already seen a 6% contraction in the
labour force over the last decade.[xix]
ii.
Certain highly regulated ‘domestic sectors’ like
health. Japan's health-care providers argue the national health insurance
system would be adversely impacted if Japanese citizens are forced to buy
foreign-produced pharmaceuticals and medical devices.[xx]
iii.
The construction sector still relies on its privileged
access to government contracts
iv.
The service sector is very inefficient because
cultural practices are burdensome and labour-intensive methods.
v. Strategic changes in the tax incentives and investment model for government pension funds.[xxii]
vi. The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) negotiations are expected to transform, or otherwise curtail subsidies for the agricultural sector, which is small-scale, highly subsidised and inefficient. In Feb-2015, Abe reached a landmark agreement that diminished the power of the national agriculture cooperative, JA-Zenchu, to direct the electoral preferences of farmer-members, by offering short term concessions to farmers in exchange for reductions in cropping; that will facilitate the modernization of farming in Japan.[xxi]
The TPP is an ambitious plan to introduce a free trade
agreement between 12 countries (The United States, Japan, Brunei, Malaysia,
Vietnam, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Mexico, Chile and Peru)
encompassing two-fifths of world trade. Abe has had to offer generous support
to farmers for the next 5 years in order to advance the plan. The question is
whether they will simply ‘take the support’ then sabotage the plan. In Abe’s
favour is the fact that his opponents, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ),
promoted the TPPA whilst in power. Japan has historically been reluctant to
remove protection on the agricultural sector, particularly upon 5 “sacred”
agricultural products. In negotiations to day, the US has been able to reduce
steadfast support for protection to tariff protection upon ‘rice, wheat and
sugar’ in exchange for more generous import quotas. The other contentious areas
are tariffs on beef and pork.[xxiii]
The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA)[xxiv]
is a transformational regional free trade agreement for Japan and other Pacific
Rim countries. Japan’s farm sector have lobbied against the deal, objecting to
the removal of high tariffs and other protective measures.
The substantiveness of change
The problem for Abe is that all the good news for Japan
harks back to ‘negative sentiments’ rather than his policy initiatives.
Consider that:
- The terms of trade is positive because Japanese
people are not spending
- The improvement in investment income and
corporate incomes is because of currency depreciation. One need only look
at production statistics. Factory output declined 3.4% in Feb-2015.[xxv]
- The improvement in exports is due to currency
depreciation
- The fall in imports is due to currency
depreciation, low confidence as well as curtailment of energy imports (as
nuclear power stations are recommissioned).
- Rising property and bond prices are due to
ultra-low interest rates; themselves an attempt to buoy demand. In years to come, those asset prices will eventually
‘return to reality’.
Almost all the rise in corporate earnings is due to the effects of a weaker yen, for example. It is nice for shareholders
to see prices rise as companies buy back their shares, but far better if
companies saw a compelling reason to invest to expand their core business.
Unfortunately, though, the population of Japan continues to dwindle.
“In some ways Japan remains less part of the world than it
was in, say, the Taisho years almost 100 years ago. [Indeed] older people say
they would prefer to be looked after by a robot than by a foreigner, according
to one survey”.[xxvi]
As long as the robot is operated by a foreigner, just like
Japan’s software, then everyone would be happy. Satisfying Japanese people is
all about preserving illusions. And yet Japanese people perplexingly and
tragically see the writing on the wall.
“Many people in Japan refer to Uber as the “black cars”, in
the same spirit that harks back to the “Black Ships” of Commander Perry, which
forced Japan to open its trade.[xxvii]
The fact is that, unless Japan takes significant strides to
open up its economy, then a great many companies are destined to abandon the
economy, despite its size. The economy is struggling for its lack of
‘openness’, its lack of population growth, and falling incomes. These tragic
prospects have even caused a number of Western companies to curtail their
investments in Japan, namely GE Capital and Citigroup.
Japan has even struggled in those arenas where it can
side-step regulatory hurdles. Apart from the success of Rakuten, Japanese
technology companies in hardware have struggled to move into value-added software services (i.e. Toshiba or Fuji Film doing better than Fujitsu).
The bigger problem however is that ‘success’ is not commonplace, as most
companies have clung to their natural market position; the security of the
domestic Japanese market. A handful of large corporations have preserved their
strong market position, relying on their privileged position, rather than
evolving. For instance, domestic banks have been slow to adopt web-based
services, which has reduced their capacity to close branches, reduce banking
fees or reduce waiting times for services.
The problems are deep-set. Education is of course another
arena requiring reform, however it is not a type of reform that is going to
come easy because it harks back to the values that made Japan possible –
political privilege and cheap labour. Those values can no longer sustain the
nation, and the collapse in birth rates provide a clue as to why the economic
growth has arrested. Japan without capitulation is destined to drift into
oblivion. The realisation of this fateful path is inevitably the only realisation
that can spare it from this fate. There is a need for a foreigner to drive the
robot, whether that robot look Japanese or Western is less important.
Autocratic teaching methods which thwart the intellectual
independence of Japan’s future wealth creators can only delay the hope of
Japan’s resurrection, or place the onus upon imported labour to drive that
restructuring. Without suitable education, ‘new age’ start-ups will be few and
far between, as their exponents will simply go abroad. Already there is
evidence of Japanese ‘thinkers’ finding opportunity abroad. Japan doesn't need more Western CEOs, it needs the 'spirit' of a Western CEO in the role of prime minister, just as the West needs. This is the popular realisation behind the appeal of Donald Trump. People are looking merely at the smoke, but the reality is that Trump would not retained his popularity if he engaged with people on issues.
Abenomics - Reforming Japan
When PM Shinzo Abe assumed office in Dec-2012, he was unable
to articulate a solid reform plan. His leadership was short-lived, however the
Japanese people nevertheless gave him a 2nd term from 2006, at which
point he outlined a new suite of policies to kick-start the stagnating economy.
Japan was caught in the midst of a deflationary spiral for two decades, with
successive leaders struggled to revitalize the economy. Abe in in the
midst of introducing a three-pronged approach, "Abenomics," combining
fiscal expansion, monetary easing and structural reform, had the ultimately
intent of concurrently boosting domestic demand and GDP, raising inflation to
2% and placing the economy on a competitive footing whence it could create ‘real
jobs’ and expand ‘real incomes’.[xxviii]
So far the stimulus has only resulted in muted ‘growth’ as
the market has not responded to the limited reforms to date. Inflation rose
slightly, but in the wake of collapsing commodity prices, it has since failed
to achieve the target. Abe however has not lost heart, though his support base
has floundered somewhat. There is of course always the prospect of further
aggressive monetary and fiscal stimulus, and further structural reforms. The fiscal
measures worth Y20.2 trillion ($US210 billion) included Y10.3 trillion ($US116
billion) of government spending.[xxix]
It was supported by concurrent quantitative easing by the Bank of Japan (BOJ) to
provide much-needed injection of liquidity to support the spending needed to achieve
2% inflation. The structural reforms — including reductions in regulations,
deregulation of labour markets, corporate tax cuts, have not achieved the much-vaunted competitiveness.
These are unprecedented levels of currency debasement by the
BOJ. If you consider that:
- The BOJ debt purchases are unprecedented[xxx]
- The reliance of the Japanese government is
concerning for a Western nation, and the world’s third largest economy. i.e.
With the value of the BOJ assets equal to 57% of GDP in 2014 – that’s more than
double the size of the U.S. Federal Reserve (25% of GDP) and ECB asset holdings
(20% of GDP) respectively.[xxxi]
The fiscal stimulus has mirrored the policies of recent
decades, with the primary benefactors being the construction companies
that support the LDP, as well as building ‘critical’ bridges, tunnels, and
earthquake-resistant roads. A relatively new aspect of the policy however was
explicit measures to stimulate private investment in strategic sectors.
[xxxii]
Such stimulus has done nothing to rein in the public sector debt,
as budget deficit persist at over 5% of GDP.
[xxxiii] The deficit should fall below 3% after the GST is increased to 10%. There is every expectation of course that the GST and a revived economy will
raise public tax receipts, however this has yet to prove the case. In fact,
phase 1 of the GST hike to 8% in April 2014 correlated with reduced consumer
spending and a recession.
[xxxiv]
For this reason the 2
nd hike in the GST to 10% has therefore been delayed until 2017.
[xxxv]
Japan is drawing no support from the global economy.
For those readers interested in our
Japan Foreclosed Property Guide, we are currently in the process of updating it. Readers can however avail of the current addition, and we will forward the new edition upon completion. There will be a price increase thereafter - and it won't be 2%. lol
References
[i]
“Japan recession worse than first reported”, Financial Times,
website,
8
th Dec 2014.
[ii]
GDP result, Dec-2014 Qtr, Cabinet Office, Govt of Japan,
website,
9
th March 2015.
[iii]
“Shinzo Abe loses ally in TPP trade deal”, Financial Times,
website,
23
rd Feb 2015.
[iv]
“The Abe habit: Shinzo Abe wins again, but what will he do with his mandate?”,
The Economist,
website,
20
th Dec 2014.
[v]
“Japan stocks rise on stimulus hopes
after poor economic data”, NZ Herald,
website, 17
th Aug 2015.
[vi]
“Japan’s economy shrinks as
consumption, investment fall”, Japan Times & Bloomberg,
website,
17
th Aug 2015.
[vii]
“Japan’s economy shrinks as
consumption, investment fall”, Japan Times & Bloomberg,
website,
17
th Aug 2015.
[viii]
“Japan logs largest January-June
current account surplus since 2010”, Japan Times & KYODO,
website, 10
th Aug 2015.
[ix]
“BOJ’s Kuroda Signals Desire for Stable Yen” by Takashi Nakamichi & Tatsuo
Ito, Wall Street Journal,
website,
18
th Feb 2015.
[x]
“Nikkei retreats from near 8-year high as Greek drama drags on” by Ayai
Tomisawa, Reuters,
website,
Feb 16, 2015.
[xi],[xii] & [xiii]
“Japan logs largest January-June
current account surplus since 2010”, Japan Times & KYODO,
website, 10
th Aug 2015.
[xiv] & [xv] “Abenomics
and the Japanese Economy” by
James McBride,
Council for Foreign Relations,
website,
10
th March 2015; “Shinzo Abe updates Japan’s Third Arrow”, Financial
Times,
website,
16
th June 2014.
[xvi]
“Japanese Economy”, Lowy Institute,
website,
retrieved 16
th Aug 2015.
[xvii]
“Attitude change needed to shake up the workforce” by Philip Brasor, Japan
Times,
website,
25
th Nov 2012.
[xviii]
“Which Parts of Japan’s Economy Most Need Reform Right Now?” by Stephanie
Johnson, Market Realist,
website, 14
th
July 2015; “Japan’s Third Arrow is more like 1,000 trial needles”, Financial
Times,
website,
18
th June 2014.
[xix]
“Abenomics can clear Japan’s demographic hurdle” by Andy Mukherjee, Reuters,
website,
14
th Mar 2013.
[xx] “Abenomics
and the Japanese Economy” by
James McBride,
Council for Foreign Relations,
website,
10
th March 2015.
[xxi]
“Abe’s Third Arrow Finds Its Mark” by Tobias Harris,
website,
11
th Feb 2015.
[xxii]
“Abenomics and the Japanese Economy” by
James McBride,
Council for Foreign Relations, website,
10
th March 2015.
[xxiii]
“Japanese Economy”, Lowy Institute,
website,
retrieved 16
th Aug 2015.
[xxiv]
“The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Negotiations and Issues for Congress”, Congressional
Research Service,
website,
20
th March 2015.
[xxv], [xxvi] &
[xxvii]
“Reforms needed to lift Japan’s economy” by Henny Sender, Financial Times,
website,
7
th April 2015.
[xxviii]
“Abenomics and the Japanese Economy” by
James McBride,
Council for Foreign Relations,
website,
10
th March 2015.
[xxix]
“Emergency Economic Measures for The Revitalization of the Japanese Economy”,
Cabinet Office, Govt of Japan,
website,
11
th Jan 2013.
[xxxi]
“Abenomics and the Japanese Economy” by
James McBride,
Council for Foreign Relations,
website,
10
th March 2015.
[xxxii]
“Japan’s Abe Unveils 10.3 Trillion Yen Fiscal Stimulus: Economy” by Keiko
Ujikane, Bloomberg,
website,
11
th Jan 2013; “Shinzo Abe unleashes a (small) stimulus package”,
The Economist,
website,
30
th Dec 2014.
[xxxiii]
“Big Swings in Japan Government Bonds Raise Hopes, Doubts about Abenomics” by
Eleanor Warnock, Wall Street Journal,
website,
17
th Feb 2015.
[xxxiv]
“Defying expectations, Japan’s economy falls into recession” by Jonathan Soble,
NY Times,
website,
16
th Nov 2014.
[xxxv]
“Japan affirms pledge to raise consumption tax in 2017”, Financial Times,
website,
12
th Feb 2015.
